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Election Hacking: A Trifecta of Sovereignty, 
Intervention, and Use of Force Violations in 
International Law 
ARLEN PRINTZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 United States Presidential election was riddled with 
accusations of foreign interference ranging from propaganda, to 
collusion with candidates, to tampering with the vote-counting systems 
themselves.1 While the most serious of these allegations have not been 
proven, the reality is that the U.S election infrastructure is vulnerable to 
outside intrusion and even “vote flipping,” meaning the altering of 
individual ballots.2 These vulnerabilities raise a new problem that must 
be addressed under international law: if one State hacks into another 
State’s election system and disrupts the infrastructure in such a way as 
 
* Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Class of 2019. B.A. in History and Minor in Russian 2013, 
Occidental College. I would like to thank Professor David Glazier for advising me on this Note, 
as well as the members of the ILR who made this publication possible. 
 1. See Aaron Mak, Evidence of Russian Election-Data Tampering Mounts as Urgency to 
Investigate It Does Not, SLATE (Sept. 1, 2017, 3:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_
slatest/2017/09/01/did_russian_hacking_of_vr_systems_affect_election_in_durham_county_new
_york.html; see also Cynthia McFadden, William Arkin & Kevin Monahan, Russians Penetrated 
U.S. Voter Systems, Top U.S. Official Says, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018, 7:28 AM), https://www.
nbcnews.com/politics/elections/russians-penetrated-u-s-voter-systems-says-top-u-s-n845721 
(describing how Russia gained access to U.S voter rolls in a very select group of states after 
initially targeting twenty-one of them). 
 2. See Election Infrastructure: Vulnerabilities and Solutions, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Sept. 11, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/09
/11/438684/election-infrastructure-vulnerabilities-solutions/ (“42 states use voting machines that 
are more than a decade old . . . Outdated voting machines pose serious security risks and are 
susceptible to system crashes, ‘vote flipping,’ and hacking.”); see also Tim Starks, Attack on 
Commonly Used Voting Machine Could Tip an Election, Researchers Find, POLITICO (Sept. 27, 
2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/27/hacking-voting-machines-814504 
(suggesting one model of vote tabulating machine used in 26 states have an “unpatched 
vulnerability that the manufacturer was notified about a decade ago,” and another model used in 
18 states that has vulnerabilities that hackers exploited to “gain physical access to a machine… in 
just two minutes.”). 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  (DO NOT DELETE) 7/27/20  6:08 PM 
292 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:2 
to effectively control the outcome, specifically by altering the ballots 
themselves and/or their totals, what international law violations do these 
actions constitute? This note argues that such election hacking 
constitutes a violation of sovereignty, an unlawful intervention under 
international law, and should also constitute an unlawful use of force. 
Only when international law accurately diagnoses the problem can it 
begin to effectively solve and deter it. 
State practice in the cyber context is very new and a lack of State 
consensus in appropriate responses to various cyber-attacks makes it 
difficult to determine what, if any, international law violations different 
cyber-attacks constitute.3 Without a clear trend of State practice or 
opinio juris relating to cyber-attack classifications and responses, on the 
surface it seems as if there can be no established customary 
international law relating to cyber-attacks. But if we analyze the cyber 
aspect of the attack as a means to an end and instead focus on the nature 
of the target and the seriousness of the attack’s effects, we can more 
clearly see which areas of international law election hacking violates. 
While this note only focuses on the most extreme, invasive forms of 
election hacking, that does not mean that less serious forms of 
interference cannot themselves be considered a violation of sovereignty, 
unlawful intervention, or even a use of force. Instead, this note seeks to 
establish a baseline by classifying the most serious form of election 
hacking, which for the purposes of this note means altering the vote 
totals or ballots themselves to control an election’s outcome. 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0: On The International Law Applicable To 
Cyber Warfare is persuasive authority that currently provides the most 
widely recognized attempt to establish a framework on how to 
categorize different cyber-attacks in the context of international law.4 In 
2013 and again in 2017, a group of international law and cyber experts 
came together on behalf of the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
Excellence (CCDCOE) to write the Tallinn Manual to advise NATO on 
international legal issues raised by cyber-warfare.5 The Tallinn Manual 
attempts to define existing international cyber obligations as well as 
 
 3. JOHANN-CHRISTOPH WOLTAG, CYBER WARFARE: MILITARY CROSS-BORDER 
COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2014).  
 4. See Tallin Manual Process, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, 
https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 5. Fahmida Rashid, Security Think Tank Analyzes How International Law Applies to Cyber 
War, SECURITY WK. (Sept. 04, 2012), https://www.securityweek.com/security-think-tank-
analyzes-how-international-law-applies-cyber-war; see also Toomas Hendrick Ilves, Forward to 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, at xiii 
(Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2d ed. 2017). 
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encourage the development of new international norms and treaty 
provisions and apply them to the cyber context.6 Still, the Tallinn 
Manual is not a definitive expression or source of law, and its influence 
on the development of international law remains to be seen.7 While the 
Tallinn Manual’s framework is sound, its experts overemphasize the 
importance of kinetic damage over non-physical damage in the 
application of their “effects” analysis.8 This emphasis on kinetic damage 
leads its experts to misapply their framework and incorrectly conclude 
that election hacking constitutes an unlawful intervention, but not a use 
of force due to the lack of physical harm.9 
International law does not necessarily require kinetic damage to 
occur to classify a State act as a use of force. Article 2(4) of the U.N 
Charter states that States may not use force against other States’ 
territorial integrity or their political independence.10 Political 
independence is not a physical concept, and although physical invasions 
constitute the most obvious threat to a country’s independence, so too 
can non-kinetic assaults on a State’s Critical Infrastructure. 11 States 
designate certain infrastructure as “critical” due to its importance to the 
individual State,12 usually for its role in carrying out functions the State 
deems “essential” or “vital” to its society, such as defense and, as this 
note will argue, governing elections.13 
Election hacking, by its nature, raises issues in the well-established 
and overlapping principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the 
prohibition of the use of force.14 This note therefore focuses on those 
three principles as they relate to election hacking and argues that 
 
 6. Ilves, supra note 5, at xxiv. 
 7. Johann-Christoph Woltag, Cyber Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L 
L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e280?prd
=EPIL (last updated Aug. 2015). 
 8. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE, 333–334 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0] (suggesting that any cyber-attack that causes physical damage to persons or 
property will automatically constitute a use of force while non-kinetic attacks that, while they 
may cause far more damage, must make it through a rigorous multi-part test to constitute a use of 
force). 
 9. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 8, at 313. 
 10. Id., at 333; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 11. Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber Force and International Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1113-14 (Marc Weller ed., 2015). 
 12. G.A Res. 58/199, Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of 
Critical Information Infrastructures, ¶ 4 (Jan. 30, 2004).  
 13. Council Directive 2008/114/EC, on the Identification and Designation of European 
Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection, 2008 O.J. (L 
345/75) (EC).  
 14. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 76 (3rd ed. 2008). 
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altering the ballots and/or vote totals constitutes a lex lata (law as it 
exists) violation of sovereignty and unlawful intervention. Then, by 
applying the Tallinn Manual’s existing consequence-based analytical 
framework, this note will make a lex ferenda (law as it should be) 
argument that international law should consider election hacking an 
unlawful use of force that in some cases rises to the level of an armed 
attack due to the grave consequences to a victim State’s sovereignty and 
political independence. 
Section I provides a historical overview of State interventions 
organized from least to most invasive and analogizes each to its cyber 
equivalent, where such an equivalent exists. Even though cyber-attacks 
are a new phenomenon, State interference in each other’s internal 
processes is not. International law should therefore view cyber-attacks 
as a new means to familiar ends rather than as an entirely new problem 
without historical analogy. This note argues that the closest historical 
equivalent to election hacking is regime change instigated by bloodless 
foreign backed coups. Both election hacking and bloodless coups can 
constitute regime change and most significantly, both involve limiting a 
State’s political independence by installing an illegitimate regime of the 
offending State’s choice. While it is true that an offending State may 
hack in support of the incumbent in the election hacking context, the 
incumbent would no longer represent the victim State’s true choice in 
leadership. Such a move would be analogous to a foreign-backed coup 
where a previously democratically elected leader lost an election and, 
with the help of a foreign government, simply nullified the results 
instead of stepping down. That leader would no longer be able to claim 
to represent the sovereign will of the victim State.15 
Section II defines and explores the related concepts of Critical 
State Infrastructure and Essential State Functions. This section argues 
that election infrastructure constitutes both Critical Infrastructure as 
well as an Essential State Function. The Critical Infrastructure 
designation is an important gauge of what States view as essential 
functions, which is highly relevant in determining whether a specific 
 
 15. See Georg Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L 
L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1702?
prd=EPIL (last updated Jan. 2010) (describing how Afghanistan’s leader invited the Soviets to 
intervene in an internal conflict on his behalf, but was himself overthrown and killed two days 
into the intervention, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the initial invitation); see also G.A. 
Res. ES-6/2 (Jan. 14, 1980) (describing the Soviet intervention as an “Armed Intervention” and a 
sovereignty violation, heavily implying that it did not recognize the invitation presented by the 
new puppet government to the Soviets as a legitimate expression of Afghanistan’s sovereign 
will).    
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attack constitutes a violation of sovereignty, an unlawful intervention, 
an unlawful use of force, or all three. 
Section III is divided into two parts. Section A argues that election 
hacking constitutes a violation of sovereignty according to the 1928 
Island of Palmas Arbitration’s articulation of sovereignty.16 Section B 
argues that election hacking constitutes a prohibited intervention in line 
with the I.C.J decision, Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment). 
This case dealt with the United States’ active support of armed rebel 
groups, the Contras, against the Nicaraguan government during the 
1980s, and provides an authoritative and uncontroversial statement on 
what constitutes a prohibited intervention according to customary 
international law.17 
Section IV takes a consequences-based approach to determine 
whether election hacking rises to the level of a use of force. This means 
it gives heavy weight to the actual effects of the attack, rather than 
making the existence of a kinetic equivalent of the cyber-action 
determinative in deciding whether it constitutes a use of force, an armed 
attack, or neither.18 This section will make use of the Tallinn Manual’s 
proposed factors to determine if an action rises to the level of a use of 
force. These factors include the severity of the consequences (the most 
important factor), the immediacy of the consequences, the directness 
between the attack and the consequences of the attack, the invasiveness 
of the attack, the measurability of the attack’s effects, the military 
character of the attack, State involvement in the attack (for the purposes 
of this note, State involvement will be assumed), and finally, the 
presumptive legality of the action.19 This section applies these factors 
and the reasoning in the Nicaragua Judgment to foreign backed coups 
and election hacking in order to ensure conformity with existing 
expressions of customary international law.20   
Section V analyzes whether election hacking rises to the level of 
an armed attack. The analysis is almost identical to the use of force 
analysis with the added factor of intent, borrowed from the Case 
Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) Judgment.21 This section 
 
 16. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, Neth.-U.S., Jan. 23, 1925, 2 R.I.A.A. 829. 
 17. GRAY, supra note 14, at 75.  
 18. YAROSLAV RADZIWILL, CYBER-ATTACKS AND THE EXPLOITABLE IMPERFECTIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (2014). 
 19. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 333-336. 
 20. See GRAY, supra note 14, at 75. 
21. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶¶ 51, 64, 67, 89, (Nov. 6) 
[hereinafter Oil Platforms, Judgment].  
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acknowledges that not all uses of force will rise to the level of an armed 
attack. This distinction is important because an armed attack may 
trigger a State’s inherent right of self-defense, which is in essence a 
lawful use of force to stop an attack, while a lesser use of force will 
not.22 Using the severity analysis from Section IV, Section V will argue 
that international law should recognize the possibility that election 
hacking may rise to rise to the level of an armed attack. This note does 
not seek to give States an excuse to inflict violence on each other. It 
only seeks for international law to recognize the seriousness of election 
hacking so that the international community may more effectively 
cooperate to deter such behavior.   
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR EQUIVALENTS IN 
CYBER-SPACE 
States have interfered in each other’s internal affairs, including 
elections, long before the advent of cyber-space. Professor Calder 
Walton, an Ernest May Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government 
who specializes in espionage research, classifies such interventions as 
“active measures.”23 These measures range from mere propaganda 
campaigns intended to influence a foreign State’s public opinion, 
intervening in elections themselves by funding preferred candidates, to 
covert acts of force aimed at regime change.24 
At the less invasive end of the active-measures spectrum lie 
propaganda campaigns. Walton describes how, during the 1984 United 
States presidential election, the Soviet Union detested President Ronald 
Reagan25 and spread propaganda via an infiltration campaign of the 
Democratic National Committee to suggest that Reagan’s election 
would mean war.26 While the technology changed, analogous 
interventions took place in 2017, when Russia, the Soviet Union’s 
successor State, was accused by Spanish officials of using online social 
media to “heavily promote Catalonia’s independence referendum…in 
 
22. Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L., ¶¶ 4, 8, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e24 (last 
updated Oct. 2013). 
23. Calder Walton, “Active Measures:” A History of Russian Interference in US Elections, 
PROSPECT MAG. (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/science-and-technology/
active-measures-a-history-of-russian-interference-in-us-elections. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  (DO NOT DELETE) 7/27/20  6:08 PM 
2019] Election Hacking 297 
an attempt to destabilize Spain.”27 Spain claimed that it detected a 
number of fake accounts on social media, half of which it traced back to 
Russia.28 This type of interference was similar to Russia’s alleged 
efforts to sow division and undermine other elections, most notably in 
the United States election of 2016.29 
More invasive than spreading propaganda, States have taken more 
aggressive steps in interfering in each other’s elections by directly 
supporting their preferred candidates. The United States, for example, 
intervened in the Italian election of 1948. Not only did the United States 
spread damaging misinformation about Socialist candidates in a 
propaganda campaign, but it also used the CIA to funnel money to 
support moderate candidates to ensure a reliably anti-Communist Italian 
government came to power.30 The United States’ direct monetary 
support of preferred Italian candidates constituted a more severe 
intervention and a higher degree of control over the outcome than a 
simple misinformation campaign. 
Even more serious interventions can be found in the modern cyber 
context. Russia, for instance, allegedly launched a three-pronged cyber-
attack on Ukraine in its 2014 election.31 Russia first allegedly used a 
friendly hacker group, CyberBerkut, to “shut down Ukraine’s Central 
Election Commission’s computer systems by disrupting the internal 
network.”32 While the Ukrainian government was able to get the system 
back online in time for the election, Russia also allegedly attempted to 
falsify vote totals of the preliminary results, which would have declared 
ultra-nationalist Dmytro Yarosh the winner, when, in reality, he 
received less than one percent of the vote.33 The Ukrainian government 
caught the change before publicly releasing the preliminary results.34 
Finally, Russia allegedly launched Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks against Ukraine’s voter tallying system, which effectively 
 
 27. Spain Sees Russian Interference in Catalonia Separatist Vote, REUTERS, (Nov. 13, 2017, 
8:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-russia/spain-sees-russian-
interference-in-catalonia-separatist-vote-idUSKBN1DD20Y. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Mak, see supra note 1.  
 30. See Walton, supra note 23.  
 31. Jason Le Miere, Russia Election Hacking: Countries Where the Kremlin Has Allegedly 
Sought to Sway Votes, NEWSWEEK (May 9, 2017, 5:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/russia-
election-hacking-france-us-606314. 
 32. Gabe Joselow, Election Cyberattacks: Pro-Russia Hackers Have Been Accused in Past, 
NBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 2:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/technology/election-
cyberattacks-pro-russia-hackers-have-been-accused-past-n673246. 
 33. Le Miere, supra note 31.  
 34. Joselow, supra note 32. 
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blocked election results for two hours, though the final results were 
deemed a “genuine election” by international observers.35 
These alleged attacks against Ukraine’s elections by Russia were 
particularly egregious, and were likely part of its overall campaign to 
undermine Ukraine, which included even more serious actions like 
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.36 It is, however, important to note 
that Russia did not alter the actual ballots or the final vote totals, and 
thus did not alter the ultimate outcome of the election.37 While effective 
and incredibly invasive, these efforts still allow the victim State a 
measure of choice. Because Russia left the final vote totals alone, it can 
be inferred that the intent behind the hack was not to instigate regime 
change, but rather to undermine trust in the Ukrainian election process. 
Similarly, and to a far lesser extent, the CIA certainly influenced the 
1948 Italian election, but it did not completely usurp the Italian State’s 
election process as its people were still free to accept or reject the CIA’s 
misinformation and elect a candidate of their choice. While one can 
argue the choice was corrupted by the offending State, the choice in 
leadership was ultimately still the victim State’s own. These 
interventions therefore do not rise to the most serious type of active 
measures: regime change. 
One infamous example of foreign-instigated regime change was 
the 1953 coup in Iran. Sixty-four years later, the CIA admitted to, and 
released details pertaining to, its involvement in the 1953 Coup that 
removed Iranian Nationalist leader Mohammad Mossadegh.38 In 1953, 
the CIA colluded with a number of high ranking conspirators in the 
Iranian army and government in an effort to remove Mossadegh for 
nationalizing Iran’s oil industry.39 Ironically, the coup almost failed 
soon after it began.40 Mossadegh had somehow caught wind and almost 
foiled the coup.41 The coup only succeeded when Kermit Roosevelt Jr., 
 
 35. Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ From 
Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 7, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers. 
 36. Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-
crimea.  
 37. Joselow, supra note 32. 
 38. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian 
Coup, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 20, 2017, 1:43 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-
later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. History of Iran: A Short Account of 1953 Coup Operation Code-name: TP-AJAX, IRAN 
CHAMBER SOC’Y (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p2.php.  
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the CIA’s head operative in Iran, ignored an order from his superiors to 
abandon the mission.42 
After discovering the plot, Mossadegh dissolved the Iranian 
parliament in an effort to consolidate power, but this only aided the 
American effort by making him appear authoritarian.43 Roosevelt and 
General Zahedi, a high-ranking Iranian conspirator who had gone into 
hiding, figured that the coup could succeed so long as they convinced 
the population that the Shah had signed two decrees: one removing 
Mossadegh from office and a second making Zahedi the “lawful” Prime 
Minister.44 After much intrigue, the CIA helped smuggle key coup 
plotters into the embassy compound to prepare for the coup once the 
prime minister’s guard was down.45 While the CIA ultimately lost 
control of the situation, pro-Shah crowds began to gather, the Shah’s 
decrees were finally published in Iranian newspapers, and Roosevelt 
helped General Zahedi out of hiding and get to a radio station where he 
spoke to the nation as the “rightful” prime minister and cemented the 
new regime’s power.46 
The 1953 coup is a prime example of regime change carried out by 
one State’s agents against another State without resorting to a full-scale 
invasion. By forcibly replacing Mossadegh with a leader of their choice, 
the United States and its allies effectively deprived the Iranian State of 
its political independence. This subtler and (relatively) bloodless form 
of regime change is an appropriate analogy for international law when 
considering the implications of election hacking. If, for instance, 
Russian efforts in Ukraine had not stopped at changing the preliminary 
results but had also altered the ballots or the final results to suggest their 
chosen candidate won, Russia would have gone beyond sabotage and 
completely usurped Ukraine’s internal process of choosing its leaders 
and thus its political independence. 
While it is true that a military coup uses force in the conventional, 
physical sense and election hacking does not, both utilize Critical 
Infrastructure within the victim State to achieve the same result: a 
traditional coup will utilize the victim State’s existing military 
infrastructure to install an illegitimate government of the offending 
State’s choice, while an election hack will utilize the victim State’s 
election infrastructure to achieve the same result. Both types of regime 
 
 42. Allen-Ebrahimian, supra note 38.  
 43. See History of Iran, supra note 41. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
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change are achieved by attacking and using a victim State’s Critical 
Infrastructure against it. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATES’ CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
There is currently no universally accepted list of what can 
constitute “Critical Infrastructure,” though the counter-terrorism arm of 
the U.N. recognizes that Critical Infrastructure encompasses cyber 
infrastructures.47 Aside from this acknowledgment and the recognition 
of Critical Infrastructure’s importance, the U.N has not defined it, 
instead “recognizing that each State determines what constitutes its 
critical infrastructure.”48 Despite the lack of a definition, the existence 
of, and need for, protection of Critical Infrastructures within States is 
still a widely accepted idea in the international community and 
supported by a number of treaties and U.N resolutions. 
In 2004, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution entitled, the “Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity 
and the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures,” which urges 
member States to protect their Critical Information Infrastructures, a 
subset of Critical Infrastructure, to achieve cyber-security.49 The 
resolution goes on to encourage member States to share their “best 
practices” with the rest of the international community to ensure better 
international cyber-security.50 Finally, the resolution encourages 
member States to trace breaches to their infrastructure and report the 
source of the attacks, specifically, in order to prevent and respond to 
them.51 The existence of this resolution indicates that States take 
intrusions into their Critical Infrastructures very seriously, which not 
only implies a general obligation under customary international law not 
to interfere in or otherwise sabotage other States’ Critical Infrastructure, 
but also implies that such an attack is much more likely to be considered 
an unlawful intervention, if not a use of force. Despite recognizing the 
concept of Critical Infrastructures, the fact that the resolution leaves its 
 
 47. U.N. Office of Counter-Terrorism, Protection of Critical Infrastructure Including 
Vulnerable Targets, Internet, and Tourism Security, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/
en/protection-critical-infrastructure-including-vulnerable-targets-internet-and-tourism-security 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018).  
 48. S.C. Res. 2341 (Feb. 13, 2017).  
 49. See generally G.A. Res. 58/199, Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the 
Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures, (Dec. 23, 2003).  
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id. at Annex: ¶¶ 4, 7, 9.  
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definition up to individual States makes it difficult to determine a clear, 
customary international law definition.52 
The practice of leaving the definition of Critical Infrastructure up 
to member States can also be found in a 2004 agreement between the 
United States and Canada to protect the border and their respective 
“Critical Infrastructure.”53 Similar to the General Assembly Resolution, 
this treaty defines Critical Infrastructure as, “Governmental and/or 
private activities or sectors that are identified by each party in its laws, 
executive orders, or policies as ‘Critical Infrastructure.’”54 We must 
therefore turn to Canadian and United States domestic law respectively. 
Canada has a broad approach, defining its Critical Infrastructure as, 
“processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets, and 
services essential to the health, safety, security, or economic well-being 
of Canadians and the effective functioning of government” (emphasis 
added), which can easily be read to include Election Infrastructure.55 
The United States, by contrast, more narrowly defines Critical 
Infrastructure as “certain national infrastructures [that] are so vital that 
their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the 
defense or economic security of the United States.”56 
Initially, the United States specifically included 
“telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil, storage and 
transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply 
systems, emergency services…and [a vague] continuity of government” 
in its list of what constitutes Critical Infrastructure.57 Only as recently as 
January 6, 2017 did the United States Department of Homeland Security 
designate its elections systems as Critical Infrastructure under the 
“Government facilities” sector, which also includes national monuments 
and icons, and education facilities.58 In defining “election 
infrastructure,” then-head of the Department of Homeland Security, Jeh 
 
 52. Id. at 1. 
 53. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America for Cooperation in Science and Technology for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and Border Security, Can.-U.S., Dec. 12, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 04-601, art. I [hereinafter 
U.S.-Can. Agreement].  
 54. Id.  
 55. PUB. SAFETY CAN., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 2 (2009) 
(emphasis added), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtcl-
nfrstrctr-eng.pdf.  
 56. Exec. Order No. 13,010, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37, 347 (July 
15, 1996). 
 57. Id.  
 58. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, STARTING POINT: U.S. ELECTION SYSTEMS AS 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 1-2 (2017), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/starting_point_us_
election_systems_as_Critical_Infrastructure.pdf. 
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Johnson, enumerated storage facilities, polling places, and centralized 
vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, and 
information and communications technology to include voter 
registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage 
the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and 
local governments.59 
Given the discretionary nature of Critical Infrastructure, some 
scholars are wary about using it as a basis to determine violations of 
international law, especially in terms of an unlawful use of force, as 
States may abuse the Critical Infrastructure concept by interpreting it 
too widely to justify an otherwise unjustifiable use of force as self-
defense.60 While this fear is understandable, the classification of election 
infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure in international law is warranted, 
as will be explored below. 
The European Union maintains a 2008 treaty, with similar 
provisions to the 2000 U.S.-Canada Treaty, which seeks to identify and 
protect its member States’ Critical Infrastructure.61 The European Union 
defined Critical Infrastructure as an, 
[A]sset, system, or part thereof located in Member States 
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal 
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-
being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which 
would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result 
of the failure to maintain those functions.62 
The European Union’s definition, while more restrictive than 
previous iterations which leave the “Critical Infrastructure” entirely up 
to the States, is more in line with existing international law notions of 
sovereignty, non-intervention, and human rights. For instance, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted 
by the U.N General Assembly states, 
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any 
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without 
unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
 
 59. Press Release, Secretary Jeh Johnson, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary 
Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector 
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-
election-infrastructure-critical#wcm-survey-target-id.  
 60. RADZIWILL, supra note 18, at 138. 
 61. Council Directive 2008/114/EC, supra note 13, at art. 1.  
 62. Id. at art. 2, § (a). 
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representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors.63 
It is important to note that not every “vital” societal interest will 
constitute an “essential state function” under international law. To 
constitute an “essential state function,” the function must govern a 
matter that international law gives States exclusive control over.64 
Following the European Union’s understanding of Critical 
Infrastructure, and applying it to the ICCPR, States’ election systems 
are not only vital to societies that have elections, but also they are 
“essential” to those States’ internal decision-making processes and their 
governments’ legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, 
international human rights law, and traditional principles of State 
sovereignty. As the mechanism that facilitates the voting requirements 
of the ICCPR and through that, State decision-making, election systems 
embody a nexus between popular and State sovereignty. Election 
systems therefore constitute both Critical Infrastructure and the 
essential State function of choosing its own leaders. An attack on 
election infrastructure, cyber or otherwise, therefore constitutes an 
attack on a State’s Critical Infrastructure and essential State function, 
which in turn invokes the overlapping international law concepts of 
sovereignty, unlawful interventions, and use of force. 
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND UNLAWFUL INTERVENTIONS IN THE ELECTION 
HACKING CONTEXT 
A. Sovereignty in Essential State Functions 
The first question is what exactly states have sovereignty over. The 
1928 Island of Palmas Arbitral Award, a case involving a territorial 
dispute between the Netherlands and United States, articulates a widely 
accepted definition of Sovereignty: 
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies 
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe 
is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other 
 
 63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III, art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 64. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities, 
Judgment]; see also Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838. 
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State, the functions of a State . . . Territorial sovereignty. . . 
involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State.65 
On the surface, the territorial definition of sovereignty poses a 
unique problem in the cyber context since cyber-space is not a physical 
space. But cyber-space cannot exist, at least currently, without physical 
manifestations that anchor it to the physical world. Moreover, these 
physical manifestations, such as servers, data centers, and undersea 
cables that connect cyber processes, are analogous to “key terrain” 
targeted in conflict like the high ground in land battles and sea lines in 
naval ones.66 The Tallinn Manual came to the conclusion that States 
exercise sovereignty over not only the physical manifestation of cyber 
infrastructure, but also the “logical and social layers” of their 
infrastructure, with “the physical layer consisting of the physical 
network components, the logical layer consisting of the connections that 
exist between network devices, and the social layer consisting of 
individuals engaging in cyber activities.”67 This is not just a 
recommendation, however, and according to international cyber law 
expert, Yaroslav Radziwill, many States currently do claim sovereignty 
over “their” cyberspace, especially when the physical infrastructures 
that support it are located within their territory.68 
While sovereignty over the physical manifestations of cyber 
infrastructure is not disputed when such infrastructure lies within the 
physical territory of a State, the question still exists as to whether States 
maintain sovereignty over “their” cyber-space that is not represented by 
physical components located entirely or mostly within the State’s 
territory.69 Still, election infrastructure is State Critical Infrastructure 
governing an essential State function over which the State has a right to 
maintain exclusive control. Therefore, a fair reading of the Island of 
Palmas decision echoed in the Nicaragua Judgment extends beyond 
territorial sovereignty and gives States sovereignty over all their 
essential functions. States have a right to decide freely the 
 
 65. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838-39. 
 66. John R. Mills, The Key Terrain of Cyber, GEO. J. INT’L. AFF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2012, at 
99-100 (crediting Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) with coming up 
with the principles of “key terrain, which refers to “vital ground” that must be gained to get the 
upper hand on an opponent).  
 67. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 12. 
 68. RADZIWILL, supra note 18, at 107.  
 69. See Kurt Mackie, Microsoft Dublin Datacenter Case Getting Supreme Court Review, 
REDMOND MAG. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://redmondmag.com/articles/2017/10/16/microsoft-dublin-
datacenter-case.aspx (explaining how the U.S government tried to force Microsoft to turn over 
data stored overseas, but Microsoft refused. This raises issues of sovereignty over data beyond the 
scope of this note that have not yet been resolved).  
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implementation of all their essential functions, regardless of the (lawful) 
method or location they choose to execute them in.70 This means that 
State A would maintain sovereignty over its essential functions even 
when those functions are carried out within a consenting State B’s 
infrastructure. 
The second question with regard to sovereignty is its violation. 
According to the Tallinn Manual, “Cyber operations that prevent or 
disregard another State’s exercise of its sovereign prerogatives 
constitute a violation of such sovereignty and are prohibited by 
international law.”71 The Tallinn Manual’s suggested rule in regard to 
cyber-space is consistent with the sovereignty rights outlined in the 
Island of Palmas decision and Nicaragua Judgment. Because States 
maintain exclusive rights over their essential State functions, meddling 
with those functions does not require kinetic damage to find a breach of 
sovereignty. What matters, especially in the cyber context, is if one 
State has inserted itself into an essential State function of another State 
without that State’s consent. 
By breaking into a State’s election system physically or via a 
cyber-attack and altering the vote count, a State will violate the victim 
State’s sovereignty because it will have usurped the essential State 
function of vote counting. A State’s election infrastructure and vote 
counting process goes to the heart of its leadership selection process and 
therefore its political independence. Whether the new leader chosen by 
the offending State actively serves the offending State or not, or indeed 
whether the offending State’s chosen candidate “wins” their election at 
all, does not matter for the purpose of finding a violation of sovereignty. 
By breaking into and attempting to usurp the essential State functions of 
vote counting and choosing its leaders, the offending State has violated 
the sovereignty of the victim State if one reads customary international 
law as recognizing State sovereignty over their essential State functions. 
Not only does such election hacking constitute a breach of the victim 
State’s sovereignty, it constitutes an unlawful intervention as well.   
B. Coups and Election Hacking: The Ultimate Unlawful Intervention 
Closely intertwined with the concept of sovereignty is the principle 
of unlawful intervention. The prohibitions of unlawful intervention and 
unlawful use of force are customary international laws, and the 
Nicaragua Judgment provides an authoritative statement on the law in 
 
 70. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205. 
 71. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 17. 
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this area.72 For an intervention to be considered “unlawful,” according 
to the Nicaragua Judgment,   
The principle [of non-intervention] forbids all States or groups 
of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or 
external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must 
accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is 
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty (italics added), 
to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, 
economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of 
foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods 
of coercion in regards to such choices, which must remain free 
ones.73 
To summarize, to be considered an unlawful intervention, an 
action taken against a State by one or more other States must contain 
two elements. First, the action must be carried out by a State or agents 
the State retains effective control over, who then interfere in matters 
which are “solely the responsibility of the inner State actors,” such as an 
essential State function.74 Second, the action must contain an element of 
coercion. Coercion means the application of various kinds of pressure 
including but not limited to threats, intimidation, and the use of force to 
compel one State to think or act in a certain way.75 
In addition to the Nicaragua Judgment’s statement on customary 
international law, the U.N Charter provides its own prohibition on both 
force and interventions more generally when it states, “All members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations (emphasis added).”76 It is that latter clause, “in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,” which is 
most relevant to the non-intervention principle.77 
The General Assembly clarified the non-intervention principle in 
its Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
 
 72. GRAY, supra note 14, at 75.  
 73. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.  
 74. Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L. 
¶ 1, http://etron.lls.edu:2177/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434?
rskey=TqufOg&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Apr. 2008).  
 75. Christopher Joyner, Coercion, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ¶ 1, http://etron.lls.edu:2177/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1749?rskey=jxgt4o&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Dec. 2006). 
 76. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 77. Id.  
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Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. The declaration states, 
The General Assembly … convinced that the strict observance 
by States of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any 
other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live 
together in peace with one another, since the practice of any 
form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the 
Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which 
threaten international peace and security… solemnly proclaims 
the following principles ….78 
The resolution goes on to state that, “States shall conduct their 
international relations in the economic, social, cultural, technical and 
trade fields in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and 
non-intervention,”79 which includes “the duty not to intervene in matters 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the 
Charter.”80 Given the U.N. charter wording and General Assembly 
clarifications, the customary international law principle of non-
intervention is a cornerstone of U.N. principles, and military force is not 
a prerequisite for violating the law of non-intervention.   
On the surface, the element of coercion may seem to require some 
kind of threat and demand made by the offending State of the victim 
State for an unlawful intervention to exist under international law. 
However, the key phrase in the I.C.J. decision is “choices which must 
(emphasis added) remain free ones.”81 One reason the United States ran 
afoul of the non-intervention principle in the Nicaragua Judgment was 
because the United States provided weapons and logistical support to 
armed bands actively trying to overthrow the Sandinista government;82 
thus threatening the State’s choice in political systems, and as a result, 
its political independence. Or to put it another way, the actions of the 
United States were coercive because they tried to compel the 
Nicaraguan State to change to a regime more favorable to the United 
States. Both election hacking and coups are analogous to this kind of 
coercion directed at the heart of State Sovereignty: its choice in 
leadership. 
 
 78. G.A. Res. 25/2625, annex, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, at 2 (Oct. 24, 1970).  
 79. Id. at 6. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.  
 82. Id. ¶ 241.  
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While the Nicaragua facts largely concern uses of force, the 
ruling’s wording, when considered alongside the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, suggests 
that any action that usurps or attacks an essential State function or a 
State’s political independence will likely constitute a violation of the 
norm of non-intervention, regardless of the presence of military force. 
While it is true that some interventions, such as spreading propaganda, 
are so minor they likely lack the coercive element necessary to be 
considered unlawful interventions, election hacking and coups 
invariably have that coercive element by usurping choice entirely in a 
way that mere propaganda does not. 
In the case of a foreign-backed coup, the offending State takes 
control over elements within the victim State’s military infrastructure to 
forcibly install a regime of the offending State’s choice, thus usurping 
the results of the victim State’s essential internal function of choosing 
its leaders. In the case of election hacking, the Tallinn Manual 
unequivocally declares ballot tampering via cyber-attacks an “illegal 
intervention.”83 This conclusion is consistent with the elements outlined 
in the Nicaragua Judgment. Because the requirement is coercion, the 
question is whether election hacking constitutes an attempt by one State 
to compel another State to act in a certain way. In the election-hacking 
context, by hacking into State B’s election infrastructure which has been 
shown to be Critical Infrastructure regulating the essential State 
Function of vote counting, State A is effectively using its cyber power 
to usurp State B’s sovereign right to elect the leader of its choice. 
According to the Declaration of Friendly Relations among States, 
choosing one’s own leadership must remain a free choice.84 By hacking 
into and altering State B’s election outcome, State A has hijacked 
Critical Infrastructure within State B and used it to usurp an essential 
State function that goes to the heart of State B’s political independence. 
It has therefore unlawfully interfered in a choice that must remain free 
by coercing the victim State into choosing a leader against its will. 
IV. ELECTION HACKING AS A USE OF FORCE 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. charter, which respected commentators 
such as Christine Gray regard as a codification of customary 
international law,85 reads, “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
 
 83. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 313. 
 84. G.A. Res. 25/2625, supra note 78, at 5.  
 85. GRAY, supra note 14, at 76.  
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”86 As in 
the case of unlawful intervention, the charter largely leaves the term 
“use of force” up to interpretation with concern for territorial integrity 
and political independence of member States at the forefront. The 
Tallinn Manual experts extrapolate that a “[c]yber operation constitutes 
a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber 
operations rising to the level of a use of force.”87 This standard is 
problematic in that it fails to account for the possibility that as the world 
increasingly relies on the Internet, a destructive cyber-attack may not 
have a non-cyber equivalent. This standard is better seen as temporary 
until cyber-norms have a chance to develop into customary international 
law of their own, but for now, it serves as a useful bridge to connect 
existing international law governing physical attacks to their cyber 
equivalent. Drawing this link is especially useful in the use of force 
context to persuade commentators unwilling to characterize an action as 
a use of force unless they can analogize it to well-established forms of 
force, hence the analogy of election hacking to a foreign-backed coup. 
The scope of the prohibition of the use of force is subject to much 
debate even in the physical realm, and the line between an unlawful 
intervention and an unlawful intervention that constitutes a use of force 
is a fuzzy one.88 The most widely accepted definition among 
commentators on the prohibition against the use of force comes from 
the Nicaragua Judgment.89 There, the court makes clear how the 
prohibition against force significantly overlaps with the prohibition 
against unlawful intervention; immediately following its discussion of 
prohibited interventions, the opinion states, 
The element of coercion, which defines and indeed forms the 
very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious 
in the case of an intervention which uses force, whether in the 
direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support 
for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State. 
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates assistance 
of this kind with the use of force by the assisting state when 
the acts committed in another state involve a threat or use of 
force. These forms of actions are therefore wrongful in the 
 
 86. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 87. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 330. 
 88. GRAY, supra note 14, at 30.  
 89. Id. at 75. 
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light of both the principle of the non-use of force and that of 
non-intervention.90 
The United States had funded the Contra rebels against the 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua and also supplied them with 
weapons and logistical support.91 While the funding alone only 
constituted a violation of the principle of non-intervention and violation 
of sovereignty,92 directly attacking oil platforms, placing mines at 
Nicaraguan ports, and arming the rebels constituted a breach of 
Nicaragua’s sovereignty, a violation of the norm of non-intervention, 
and a prohibited use of force.93 Supplying an armed group with weapons 
was a trifecta of unlawful use of force, unlawful intervention, and 
violation of sovereignty, while supplying an armed group with money 
was only an unlawful intervention and violation of sovereignty.94 Still, 
the court did not establish that the kind of force leveled against 
Nicaragua was the minimum threshold of what constitutes a use of force 
against a State. The court did lay out a “scale and effects” test related to 
the use of force, but this test was to determine whether an already 
established use of force was tantamount to an armed attack, which, 
unlike a lesser use of force, could trigger the victim State’s right of self-
defense against the aggressor State.95 Without a similar test for what 
constitutes a use of force to begin with, scholars have been left to debate 
the minimum threshold. 
This note takes a “contextualist” approach in its use of force 
analysis, which contends that coercion is a common element of 
unlawful interventions and unlawful uses of force, and that 
interventions fall along a continuum ranging from relatively non-
invasive interventions that lack a coercive element like propaganda, to 
unlawful interventions like funding a rebel army, and prohibited uses of 
force and armed attacks.96 The contextualist approach is also effects-
centric and holds that international law should classify actions by the 
harm to the victims and the aims of international law as represented by 
 
 90. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 205.  
 91. Id. ¶ 241.  
 92. Id. ¶¶ 228, 251. 
 93. Id. ¶ 251. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 228, 251.  
 95. Id. ¶ 195; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161,  
¶¶ 51, 64 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil Platforms, Judgment] (following the Nicaragua court’s 
reasoning in distinguishing armed attacks from lesser uses of force to hold that Iran’s attack on 
the ship, Sea Isle City, did not constitute an armed attack and, therefore, did not trigger a right of 
self-defense from the U.S.).  
 96. See generally Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War 62-63 
(2006).   
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the U.N. charter without requiring that harm to be physical in nature.97 
This school is represented by scholars such as Michael Schmitt, who is 
best known for his work in the realm of international cyber-law.98 
The contextualist approach is especially helpful in the cyber realm 
since cyber-attacks can result in non-kinetic, but still catastrophic 
damage to a State’s interests as well as to the U.N. charter’s goals of 
peace, stability, and respecting the political independence of its member 
States.99 Because of its flexibility, the Tallinn Manual embraces this 
contextualist approach in a multi-factor “scale and effects” test derived 
from the Nicaragua Judgment and Schmitt’s writings to determine when 
a cyber-attack rises to the level of a use of force.100 Because the 
Nicaragua Judgment draws a distinction between a use of force and an 
armed attack by using a scale and effects test to determine the line 
between them, it is logical to apply a similar scale and effects test to 
determine the line between a coercive act that constitutes an unlawful 
intervention and one that constitutes an unlawful use of force. The 
Tallinn Manual framework is extremely useful in the election hacking 
context. This note will therefore apply the Tallinn Manual factors as far 
as they align with the Nicaragua Judgment’s reasoning to determine if 
election hacking constitutes a use of force. 
To define the “scale and effects” test laid out in the Nicaragua 
Judgment, the Tallinn Manual adopts a test analyzing eight factors to 
determine if a particular action rises to the level of a use of force 
including severity, immediacy of the consequences, directness between 
the attack and its consequences, invasiveness of the action, 
measurability of the attack’s effects, military character of the attack, 
state involvement, and presumptive legality of the action.101 All 
“reasonably foreseeable consequences” of the cyber-attack may be 
considered for the use of force analysis.102 For example, if State A arms 
a rebel group in State B, a reasonably foreseeable consequence is the 
use of those weapons against State B’s government. Thus, that effect 
may be considered in determining whether arming the rebel group 
 
 97. Id.; see also Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defense, and the Problem of 
Attribution, 17 J. Conflict & Security L. 229, 231 (2012) (claiming that any attack on a “critical 
state infrastructure that paralyses or massively disrupts the apparatus of the State should be 
equated to an armed attack, even if it does not cause any immediate human injury or material 
damage.” The commentator cites an attack on a State’s financial system that “causes massive 
disruption to the economic life of a State” as an example.).  
 98. See Schmitt, supra note 11. 
 99. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 2, ¶¶ 1-4.  
 100. Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 5, at 331.  
 101. Id. at 334-36.  
 102. Id. at 343. 
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constitutes a use of force. Similarly, if State A alters the ballots and / or 
vote count for State B’s election, an illegitimate government coming to 
power in State B is a reasonably foreseeable consequence and may be 
considered in the use of force factors test. 
A. Severity 
The severity of the attack, which is the most important and 
determinative factor, analyzes the scale of harm to the victim State, 
subject to a de minimis test where physical harm to individuals or 
property will always qualify as a use of force regardless of the intent 
behind the action, while attacks generating mere “inconvenience or 
irritation” will not.103 Arming rebels as in the Nicaragua case would 
meet this test, assuming the weapons were used and hit their targets, and 
would likely cross this threshold even if the rebels ousted the 
government with the threat of force alone as in a bloodless coup. By 
contrast, propaganda that simply irritates the victim state and 
inconveniences it by introducing a harmful narrative to combat but 
otherwise causes no damage will never constitute a use of force. But 
when harm is not physical and there is no obvious threat of physical 
force, this factor will look at the “critical national interests” affected and 
the scope, duration, and intensity of the attack’s consequences.104 
The nature of the target is critical here, and an attack on critical 
State Infrastructure should be considered strongly indicative of meeting 
the dispositive severity factor. A minority of the Tallinn Manual’s 
experts who back this view argue that an attack on a State’s Critical 
Infrastructure should be considered an armed attack if the consequences, 
kinetic or otherwise, are severe enough.105 For the purposes of this 
analysis, a Critical Infrastructure designation is strongly indicative of a 
State’s “Critical National Interest,” since the designation requires States 
to view the infrastructure as important enough to their national interest 
to label them “Critical” in the first place.106   
Election infrastructure is a vehicle for the internal decision-making 
process that must remain exclusive to the State, as per the customary 
international law definition of sovereignty outlined in the Island of 
Palmas decision.107 It is the assault on this process rather than physical 
damage to the voting machines that cause the most damage to a State; 
 
 103. Id. at 136, 334. 
 104. Id. at 334. 
 105. Id. at 343, 345.  
 106. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. at 37347. 
 107. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838.  
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machines can be repaired, but if the process itself is attacked by altering 
vote counts, even if the attack is discovered and corrected, a major 
consequence will be a loss of faith by the victim State’s populace in its 
election infrastructure. This loss of confidence is especially significant 
in democratic forms of government which derive their legitimacy from 
their people’s faith that the process accurately reflects the popular 
will.108 The consequences of a successful hack are even more severe.   
Election infrastructure represents the essential State function of 
choosing its own leaders, which is central to a State’s political 
independence and also its sovereignty.109 A significant and especially 
severe consequence of election hacking is the usurping of an essential 
State function in choosing its leaders if the hacking is not detected in 
time. Even if the election hacking aided the incumbent rather than the 
opposition party, a successful, uncorrected attack still usurps the 
internal decision-making process of the State and through that its 
political independence, as the incumbent no longer reflects the popular 
will reflected by the State’s unaltered internal process. 
The ultimate goal and, arguably, the most severe consequence of 
actions such as election hacking, orchestrating a coup, and supporting 
armed rebel groups is to usurp a State’s political independence. The 
Tallinn Manual recognizes the severity of targeting and removing a 
State’s leadership when it declared that a cyber-attack that kills a head 
of State abroad is tantamount to not just a use of force but an armed 
attack as well.110 The fact that election hacking achieves this goal 
without physical violence does not minimize the threat or damage to a 
State’s political independence by the rightful leader’s removal nor does 
it matter if the offending State does not control the usurpers once they 
take power.111 Indeed, the effects of election hacking on a victim State’s 
political independence have the potential to be even more severe than 
those of an assassination since election hacking not only removes a 
rightful leader from power, but also decides the successor. Because of 
the nature of the attack, the nature of the targets (in this case an attack 
on a State’s Critical Infrastructure that usurps an essential State 
function), and the severity of the consequences of assaulting a State’s 
 
 108. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 868-69 (1990). 
 109. Agreement Concerning Island of Palmas, supra note 16, at 838.  
 110. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 346.  
 111. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 115 (explaining that 
the Nicaragua Court established an “effective control” test in order to find one State responsible 
for the paramilitary group’s actions. However, this standard is used to establish State 
responsibility, not severity).  
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very political independence, customary international law’s prohibition 
of the use of force should at a minimum be read to include election 
hacking. 
B. Immediacy of the Consequences 
The second factor that the Tallinn Manual describes is the 
immediacy of the consequences. This factor reasons that the quicker the 
consequences of an attack manifest themselves, the less time States 
have to peacefully resolve the dispute or otherwise mitigate the harmful 
effects. Therefore, States will be more likely to treat attacks with 
immediate consequences as a use of force compared to attacks where 
the consequences have a slow-drip effect that builds over time.112 In the 
case of election hacking, this factor may lean against finding a use of 
force since there could be months in between the revealing of the false 
vote totals and the new illegitimate leader ascending to office. On the 
other hand, the transition of power would potentially begin immediately 
after the election is called.113 Still, this factor is less critical to the 
analysis than the severity factor, as evidenced by the Nicaragua court 
finding that arming rebels can constitute an unlawful use of force.114 The 
actual effects of that support may not have been felt for months after the 
fact, but that did not at all mitigate finding an unlawful use of force in 
the court’s reasoning.115 Far more important is where the consequences 
lie in the chain of causation described below. 
C. Directness of the Consequences 
The third factor considers the directness between the attack and its 
consequences. Essentially, an attack where the direct consequences are 
slight, but lead to greater indirect harm in the chain of causation, are 
less likely to be deemed a use of force by States than attacks that cause 
direct harm.116 Applying this reasoning to the Nicaragua Judgment, the 
direct consequence of the United States arming the Contras was armed 
attacks carried out by the Contras, while the direct consequence of 
simply funding the Contras was one step removed: they had to purchase 
 
 112. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 334.  
 113. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump’s Transition in a ‘Long History’ of Rocky 
Presidential Handovers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/11/17/us/politics/obama-white-house-transition.html (describing how the transfer of power 
in the United States normally begins within days after the election). 
 114. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 95.  
 115. Id. ¶¶ 195, 237. 
 116. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 334. 
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their own armaments before they could carry out armed attacks. Even 
though the reasonably foreseeable consequences of funding the Contras 
were the Contras arming themselves and carrying out attacks with those 
armaments, the court reasoned that directly arming them constituted a 
use of force, while merely providing funding did not.117 Following this 
reasoning, the direct consequences of election hacking are the changing 
of the ballots and the installing of an illegitimate government; there is 
no intermediary step. Unlike the case of arming rebels or organizing a 
coup, where action by the rebels or coup plotters is required before the 
harm occurs, there is no intermediary independent action required by 
the State precisely because the ballots themselves represent the State’s 
independent decision. By altering them, the offending State has 
effectively removed that independent choice from the victim State, 
making the consequences of election hacking extremely close to the 
attack in the chain of causation. The directness factor between the attack 
and the harm therefore leans in favor of a use of force. 
D. Invasiveness of the action 
The fourth factor is invasiveness. This factor analyzes how secure 
the hacked system is, with more secure systems indicating a greater 
degree of importance to the victim State: the more secure the system, 
the more likely its hacking will be viewed as a use of force.118 
Additionally, the Tallinn Manual experts fold in an ‘intent’ analysis 
where the more the effects of an attack are limited to the targeted state, 
the more invasive the attack will be perceived.119 However, the Tallinn 
Manual experts make clear that mere espionage will never be enough to 
constitute a use of force on its own, regardless of how invasive the 
operation, unless the espionage damages the networks in the process.120 
Still, the effectiveness of a country’s security measures, or lack thereof, 
do not necessarily indicate the importance of the infrastructure being 
hacked, and the Tallinn Manual experts merely provided one method of 
determining the importance of different cyber infrastructures to a State. 
The invasiveness factor should therefore not depend on the difficulty of 
the hack alone. Rather, the invasiveness analysis should focus on the 
nature of the target and how closely it is tied to essential State functions, 
the State’s sovereignty, and if it qualifies as Critical Infrastructure. 
 
 117. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶¶ 109, 118. 
 118. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 334.  
 119. Id. at 335.  
 120. Id. 
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In the case of election hacking, the invasiveness analysis is very 
similar to the severity analysis given election systems’ likely status as 
Critical Infrastructure and their central role in a State’s decision-making 
process that goes to the heart of its political independence. Additionally, 
the effects of election hacking are very deliberate and very limited to 
whichever State systems were hacked. Thus, the invasiveness analysis 
heavily leans in favor of finding a use of force.   
E. Measurability of Effects 
The fifth factor is the measurability of effects. This factor reasons 
that the more apparent and quantifiable the consequences of the 
operation are, the more likely a State will be willing to characterize an 
action as a use of force.121 Applying this factor to the Nicaragua 
Judgment’s reasoning, there was a measurable number of arms supplied 
to the Contras, and their use resulted in measurable harm. This factor 
essentially requires an attack to have an objective measure of damage to 
lean in favor of a use of force. In the case of election hacking, there are 
measurable effects: the number of ballots altered, or the difference 
between the manufactured results and the real results, are easily 
measurable numbers. In the coup context, somewhat ironically, the 
“objective and measurable” criteria are lacking in that the only 
“measurable harm” will be the damage and collateral damage involved 
in removing the old regime, which may very well be minimal if the 
coup is efficient enough. In the case of coups, as in the case of election 
hacking, what is ultimately threatened are the political independence 
and sovereignty of States, which are not easily quantifiable principles. 
However, their respect lies at the heart of customary international law as 
well as the U.N. Charter.122 It would therefore be highly illogical to 
consider an assault on them less likely to constitute a use of force 
simply because the offending State figured out a way to usurp a victim 
State’s political independence without inflicting easily quantifiable 
harm. Thus, even if the effects of an attack are largely subjective, they, 
as in the case of attacks that usurp a country’s political independence 
and sovereignty, can still be extremely severe. The severity factor is 
therefore, ultimately, the most important factor and significantly 
outweighs the measurability of effects in the eight-part test. 
 
 121. Id. at 335-336. 
 122. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 2, ¶¶ 1–4. 
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F. Military Character of the Attack 
The sixth factor is the military character of the attack. This factor 
is a holdover from the traditional view of the use of force, and thus 
makes a “military character” attack more likely to be considered a use 
of force than an attack without “military character.”123 The Tallinn 
Manual justifies the inclusion of this factor by citing the U.N. Charter’s 
preamble, which reads, “We the Peoples of the United Nations 
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war. . .And for these ends. . .to ensure. . .that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest.”124 “Military Character” therefore 
implies a type of armed force employed by State militaries against a 
victim State’s military targets.125 The Nicaragua court made particular 
issue of the type of aid provided by the United States to the Contras, and 
application of this factor to the court’s reasoning helps to explain why 
supplying rebel soldiers with weapons to fight a State’s government, a 
clearly militaristic action, is more likely to constitute a use of force than 
simply providing that same rebel group with funds that can be used for a 
variety of purposes.126 A foreign backed coup may invoke this “military 
character” factor by utilizing the offending State’s intelligence 
apparatus to control elements within the victim State’s military to 
achieve forcible regime change, as demonstrated by the U.S.-backed 
coup in Iran.127 Similarly, the scale of a successful election hacking 
operation may utilize an offending State’s military infrastructure in 
carrying out cyber-attacks, which would give the attack a military 
character.128 But, election hacking may also lack this military character 
as an offending State may be able to utilize lone hackers unaffiliated 
with its military. In addition, the targeted election systems, while 
Critical Infrastructure, are not understood to have a military character.129 
 
 123. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336 (citing to the DOD MANUAL: OFFICE OF 
THE GENERAL COUNSEL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (June 2015), para.16.3.1: “Cyber 
operations that cripple a military’s logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and sustain 
military operations, might also be considered a use of force under jus ad bellum”). 
 124. U.N. Charter, Preamble.  
 125. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336.  
 126. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 228. 
 127. History of Iran, supra note 41. 
 128. See China Military Unit ‘Beyond Prolific Hacking’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21502088 (discussing the rumors of how a cyber-
unit of the Chinese military is responsible for stealing “hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 
141 organizations all around the world.” If the hackers are indeed associated with the Chinese 
military, this attack could be said to have a “military character” under the Tallinn Manual’s 
parameters).  
 129. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, supra note 58, at 1.  
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Still, because of election Infrastructure’s deep ties to a State’s 
sovereignty and political independence, the severity factor should 
significantly outweigh the possible lack of military character in the 
election hacking context. 
G. State Involvement 
The seventh factor is State involvement and, through that, State 
responsibility. This factor asserts that the clearer the “nexus” between 
the attack and its official agencies, the more likely a victim State will 
consider the attack a use of force.130 For the purposes of this note, it is 
assumed that the offending State maintains “effective control” over the 
agents responsible for hacking into State B’s election systems.131 By 
extension, State responsibility is pre-assumed for the purposes of the 
election hacking analysis. 
H. Presumptive Legality 
The eighth and last factor is presumptive legality. This factor 
reasons that because “international law is generally prohibitive in 
nature, acts that are not forbidden are permitted.”132 If an action is not 
considered a different violation of international law under existing rules, 
a State is less likely to consider the action an unlawful use of force. A 
relevant example here is the spreading of propaganda to influence a 
State’s populace: the action is not considered an unlawful intervention 
or even a violation of sovereignty and, thus would be highly unlikely to 
constitute a use of force.133 By contrast, every time the court in the 
Nicaragua Judgment found an action to constitute an unlawful use of 
force, it had also found that same action to constitute another 
international law violation, usually a violation of sovereignty and/or 
unlawful intervention.134 This is not to say that an additional 
international law violation is a prerequisite to the existence of an 
unlawful use of force but merely that if one action violates international 
law for a different reason, it increases the chance the illegal action will 
constitute a use of force as well. And, if the action is not presumably 
illegal, it is less likely to be seen as an unlawful use of force. 
 
 130. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336. 
 131. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 115 (describing 
how a State must have “effective control” over a group in order to be held legally responsible for 
the actions of said group). 
 132. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 336.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶¶ 228, 241, 251. 
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Because election hacking is already presumed illegal, in that it 
violates State sovereignty and constitutes an unlawful intervention, and 
because the measurability of the effects factor, invasiveness factor, 
directness factor, and all-important severity factor all heavily lean in 
treating election hacking as a use of force, international law should 
recognize election hacking as an unlawful use of force as well. 
V. ELECTION HACKING AS AN ARMED ATTACK 
As a general rule, an armed attack will always constitute a use of 
force, but a use of force may not always rise to the level of an armed 
attack.135 This distinction between a use of force and armed attack 
matters because an armed attack can trigger a State’s right to individual 
and collective self-defense, while a use of force below that threshold 
does not.136 All the factors that were analyzed in the use of force section, 
including reasonably foreseeable consequences, directness, and severity, 
also apply to determining whether the action rises to the level of an 
armed attack. But, because self-defense, to be lawful, must be both 
proportional and necessary to repel the armed attack suffered,137 victim 
States must also consider the intent of the offending State as well as 
whether the action is sufficiently grave to justify an armed response. 
Intent and meeting the graveness threshold are not factors; they are 
necessary elements in finding an armed attack. 
A. Intent 
The court in Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), a case that involved the 
attack on a U.S. ship with Iranian sea mines, implied that a lack of 
intent will mitigate against finding that an individual use of force 
constitutes an armed attack.138 If an attack was accidental, future attacks 
are unlikely to follow, so any force used in response to the accidental 
attack would be a retaliation rather than an act of self-defense. 
Conversely, as in the case of a coup or election hacking, regime change 
constitutes the explicit intent behind both operations. Therefore, the 
“intent” element should be satisfied in both election hacking as well as a 
 
 135. Oil Platforms, Judgment, supra note 21, at 187, 191. 
 136. Id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack (italics added) occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security.”) . 
 137. Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e401?prd=EPIL (last updated Apr. 2011). 
 138. Oil Platforms, Judgment, supra note 21, ¶¶ 51, 64.  
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foreign-backed coup. But intent alone is not dispositive of an armed 
attack; it is merely a necessary element. 
B. The Graveness Threshold 
The current customary international law as described in the 
Nicaragua Judgment is vague in describing when a use of force rises to 
the level of an armed attack, saying only that its scale and effects must 
be sufficiently “grave.”139 In the cyber context, experts are divided on 
the type of approach to use, with some advocating a “strict liability” 
approach which would treat any attack on a State’s Critical 
Infrastructure as an armed attack, and others advocating an effects-
based approach, which looks at the scope and severity of the attack’s 
effects.140 The strict liability approach, while tempting in its simplicity, 
suffers due to a lack of consensus regarding what constitutes “Critical 
Infrastructure” in the first place as well as the fact that the effects on 
said Critical Infrastructure may be minor.141 The effects-based approach, 
on the other hand, more closely resembles the Nicaragua Judgment’s 
focus on the actual consequences of the attack and thus is the approach 
this note embraces.142 Therefore, consideration of the nature of the 
target, e.g. election infrastructure that has been demonstrated to 
constitute Critical Infrastructure, will be folded into the severity 
analysis which will determine if an action is sufficiently “grave” to 
constitute an armed attack.   
C. The Consequences to Consider 
As in the use of force analysis, the Tallinn Manual’s experts 
unanimously agreed that only “reasonably foreseeable consequences” 
should be considered in determining if a use of force constitutes an 
armed attack.143 For instance, if an attack targets a water purification 
plant, the damage to the plant will, in and of itself, constitute a use of 
force, but the resulting sicknesses from tainted water should also be 
taken into account when deciding if that use of force rises to the level of 
an armed attack because sickness from tainted water is a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of an attack on a water purification center.144 
Similarly, in the coup and election hacking contexts, regime change and 
 
 139. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶¶ 191, 195. 
 140. RADZIWILL, supra note 18, at 138.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 343. 
 144. Id. 
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a limiting of the victim State’s political independence are reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of that kind of attack. 
D. Directness 
The armed attack analysis, to be consistent with the Nicaragua 
Judgment, must weigh the “directness” factor more stringently than in 
the use of force analysis.145 Even though the United States clearly 
intended the weapons it supplied to the Contras to be used in armed 
attacks against the Nicaraguan government and that their use was a 
highly foreseeable consequence, the court was not willing to classify 
arming rebel group as an armed attack.146 The act of supplying the 
weapons was one step removed from their use in the chain of causation 
that caused the damage. In order to hold the United States responsible 
for the armed attacks carried out with the supplied weapons, Nicaragua 
needed to demonstrate that the United States maintained “effective 
control” over the Contras’ actions and that the Contras were “subject to 
the United States to such an extent that any acts they have committed 
are imputable to that State,” which it had failed to do.147 The foreign-
backed coup context may suffer from a similar directness problem since 
the offending State will invariably work with internal actors within the 
victim State, similar to the United States working with the Contras in 
Nicaragua. Merely providing these actors with the means to achieve 
regime change, given the Nicaragua standard, will not be enough to 
classify this use of force as an armed attack. The victim State would 
have to demonstrate that the offending State had “effective control” 
over the coup plotters.148 Election hacking, by contrast, does not trigger 
the directness problem.   
As explained in the use of force analysis, an election hack does not 
suffer from an indirectness classification precisely because there is no 
friendly agent required in the victim State. If a State provided actors 
within another State with the means to hack into their own election 
systems and instructed them in how to achieve this, that would be 
analogous to arming a rebel army, and the Nicaraguan court’s “effective 
control” standard would have to be demonstrated before ruling the 
incident an armed attack. However, with a direct hack, there is no 
friendly intermediary required within the victim State; there is only the 
direct attack into a State’s Critical Infrastructure. This means that the 
 
 145. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 195.  
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more stringent directness factor does not weigh against treating direct 
election hacking as an armed attack. With the more stringent directness 
factor and intent factor weighing in favor of an armed attack, the only 
factor left to consider is severity. 
E. Severity 
The severity analysis in the armed attack context is similar to the 
use of force analysis. The Advisory Council on International Affairs 
took the position, since adopted by the Netherlands, that a cyber-attack 
must be regarded as an ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter if it causes (or has the potential to cause) serious 
disruption to the functioning of the [S]tate or serious or prolonged 
consequences for the stability of the [S]tate, even if there is no physical 
damage or injury, with a de minimis recommendation against counting a 
mere “impediment” or “delay” of State functions.149 So, while a cyber-
attack that merely slows down the voting machines or otherwise 
confuses the voters may not pass the de minimis threshold, altering the 
election results almost certainly does. First, election hacking attacks the 
State’s Critical Infrastructure itself. Second, as in the case of a coup, 
election hacking usurps the essential State function of choosing its own 
leaders. Finally, it installs an illegitimate government against the victim 
State’s wishes, which, in turn, usurps the victim State’s political 
independence.   
It must be acknowledged that the Nicaragua Judgment was 
unwilling to find the existence of an “armed attack” that did not involve 
some sort of physical damage or “armed bands . . . on a significant 
scale.”150 At first glance, it may seem like hackers constitute a loophole 
to this “armed bands” standard. However, many States incorporate 
cyber-activities into their militaries and intelligence agencies. Russia, 
for instance, maintains a dedicated unit of “internet trolls” that wages 
propaganda campaigns against its perceived enemies.151 China maintains 
a figurative army of hackers that launch ninety thousand attacks a year 
against U.S. Defense Department computers.152 A hacker force armed 
with cyber-weapons descending upon a State’s Critical infrastructure 
 
 149. Advisory Council on International Affairs, Cyber Warfare, No. 77, AIV/No. 22, CAVV 
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 150. Military and Paramilitary Activities, Judgment, supra note 64, ¶ 195. 
 151. Maya Kosoff, The Russian Troll Farm that Weaponized Facebook had American Boots 
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should logically meet this “armed band” standard. The avenue of attack 
should not matter. What matter are the scale and effects of the attack. 
CONCLUSION 
Many international law commentators are resistant to classifying 
attacks that do not result in death or physical destruction as a use of 
force or armed attack. Though the Tallinn Manual experts more readily 
accept that non-kinetic attacks can constitute a use of force, some of its 
experts still take the position that a non-kinetic use of force can never 
rise to the level of an armed attack.153 However, the purpose at the heart 
of self-defense—prohibitions on the use of force, unlawful 
interventions, and violations of State sovereignty—is to protect the 
political independence and “sovereign equality” of States.154 Surely, an 
attack that threatens every one of these principles at once must qualify 
as among the gravest uses of force. The classification of election 
hacking as a violation of sovereignty, unlawful intervention, and use of 
force that may rise to the level of an armed attack is not a call to arms. It 
is a call to reality in recognizing the severity of usurping a State’s 
political independence. 
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